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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES, ACCOUNTABILITY 
LEGISLATION AND A DOUBLE NEGATIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
To the States, or any one of them, or any city of the States, Resist much, obey 
Little, 
Once unquestioning obedience, once fully enslaved, 
Once fully enslaved, no nation, state, city, of this earth, ever afterward resumes 
its liberty.1 
  [W]hen the private corporation to be aided by eminent domain is as large 
and influential as General Motors, the power of eminent domain, for all 
practical purposes, is in the hands of the private corporation.  The municipality 
is merely the conduit . . . . 
  Eminent domain is an attribute of sovereignty.  When individual citizens 
are forced to suffer great dislocation to permit private corporations to construct 
plants where they deem it most profitable, one is left to wonder who the 
sovereign is.2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the last two decades, states and municipalities have increasingly used 
public assets to keep local businesses from relocating or to lure businesses 
away from other states.3  Incentives take the form of direct subsidies, low-
interest loans or development bonds, investment tax credits, property, income 
and franchise tax abatements, infrastructure improvements, worker training 
and the gift or sale of property seized by eminent domain.4  The amount of 
 
 1. WALT WHITMAN, To the States, in LEAVES OF GRASS 9 (Avatine Press 1931). 
 2. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 481 (Mich. 1981) 
(Ryan, J., dissenting). 
 3. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause 
Constraints on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REV. 377, 383 (1996); 
Declaration of Policy, 1994 Iowa Acts (75 G.A.) ch. 1008, § 1 (1994).  More than forty states 
offer incentives that were rarely used as of 1980.  See Kary L. Moss, The Privatizing of Public 
Wealth, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 101, 106 (1995). 
 4. See Steven R. Little, Corporate Welfare Wars: The Insufficiency of Current Constraints 
on State Action and the Desirability of a Federal Legislative Response, 22 HAMLINE L. REV. 849, 
854-56 (1999). 
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assistance given by these methods has also increased dramatically.5  At the 
same time, states and municipalities have traditionally had no recourse in the 
event an incentive recipient relocates again, cuts back commercial activity or 
otherwise fails to deliver on promised jobs and economic benefits.6 
Little evidence suggests that these economic development incentives are 
having a net economic benefit in the communities that provide them.7  Rather, 
since all states are doling out incentives, the competition among states for 
location of businesses and industry results merely in the expectation of a public 
contribution to business location decisions, and an overall shift in resources 
from public to private.8  This shift in resources occurs at an inopportune time, 
as in this decade many cities have gone bankrupt, or had to close or sell 
facilities such as schools and hospitals, lay off essential employees and reduce 
allocations to infrastructural improvements to avert fiscal collapse.9  Some 
commentators have likened the interstate competition for business to a “race to 
the bottom,”10 analogous to the frantic modification in corporate law at the turn 
of the century to attract businesses into incorporating within a particular 
state,11 but with potentially greater economic consequences to the participants.  
Others have likened this competition to a “second Civil War,”12 and there has 
been an academic outcry for a federal legislative response.13 
 
 5. It is impossible to decipher accurately how much assistance is given out annually, as 
records are often not made public.  See, e.g., Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Special 
Report: Corporate Welfare, a System Exposed, TIME, Nov. 9, 1998.  Furthermore, the amount of 
indirect subsidies to businesses in the form of tax abatements and credits is even more difficult to 
calculate.  Estimates of aid from state and local authorities, not including federal aid, run as high 
as $50 billion annually.  See KENNETH P. THOMAS, COMPETING FOR CAPITAL: EUROPE AND 
NORTH AMERICA IN A GLOBAL ERA 159 (2000).  In 1992, Massachusetts claimed a $2.5 billion 
yearly loss due to commercial tax abatements, a figure amounting to more than one-third of the 
state’s total estimated revenues absent the abatements.  Meanwhile, Michigan identifies nearly 
$4.9 billion in such tax incentives.  See Enrich, supra note 3, at 388. 
 6. See Moss, supra note 3, at 103. 
 7. See generally GOOD JOBS FIRST, INSTITUTE ON TAXATION AND ECONOMIC POLICY, 
MINDING THE CANDY STORE: STATE AUDITS OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 35-41 (2000) 
[hereinafter GJF Audit Survey] (discussing the results of fifteen state audits that show little 
evidence that development programs are improving the economic conditions they were created to 
address).  The debate on the economic value of development incentives is explored further infra 
notes 65-88 and accompanying text. 
 8. See Clayton P. Gillette, The Law and Economics of Federalism: Business Incentives, 
Interstate Competition, and the Commerce Clause, 82 MINN. L. REV. 447, 479 (1997). 
 9. See Peter Dreier, America’s Urban Crisis: Symptoms, Causes, Solutions, 71 N.C. L. 
REV. 1351, 1371-74 (1993) (discussing corporate flight as a root cause of the fiscal calamity 
facing many American cities). 
 10. Gillette, supra note 8, at 451. 
 11. See Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-64 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 12. Enrich, supra note 3, at 377. 
 13. See generally Little, supra note 4; Matthew Schaefer, State Investment Attraction 
Subsidy Wars Resulting From a Prisoner’s Dilemma: The Inadequacy of State Constitutional 
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A congressional act is usually seen as the most rational solution to the 
interstate subsidy wars, because a state’s unilateral attempt to restrict location 
subsidies would theoretically place that state at an immediate disadvantage in 
competing for business.14  Several attempts by state governors to negotiate 
non-compete agreements have failed.15  However, in recent years, states and 
municipalities have begun adopting measures for self-empowerment in the 
granting of development incentives.  Since 1994, at least sixty jurisdictions 
have enacted legislation that conditions receipt of assistance on meeting job 
creation goals or other economic criteria, or otherwise holds businesses 
accountable for public benefits expected to result from the incentives.16  Many 
of these statutes include “clawbacks,”—provisions that allow state and local 
governments to recoup their costs when recipients of development incentives 
fail to live up to their end of the bargain.17  Other provisions permit the 
development agency to rescind or recalibrate the assistance being given, or to 
assess damages, upon the non-occurrence of certain specified goals.18  Thus 
far, there has been little negative impact on the perceived business climate of 
communities operating under these accountability statutes, and the trend is 
being described as a “quiet revolution in economic development that the media 
has overlooked.”19 
Given the recent proliferation of accountability legislation, the financial 
magnitude of the subsidies they govern, and the lack of success recipients have 
had in meeting targets contemplated by the granting of incentives, it is nearly 
 
Solutions and the Appropriateness of a Federal Legislative Response, 28 N.M. L. REV. 303 
(1998); Melvin L. Burstein & Arthur J. Rolnick, Congress Should End the Economic War Among 
the States, THE REGION (March 1995), reprinted in 10 STATE TAX NOTES 1895 (1996); Mark 
Taylor, A Proposal to Prohibit Industrial Relocation Subsidies, 72 TEX. L. REV. 471 (1994).  For 
a discussion of the form that such a federal act might take, see infra notes 104-10 and 
accompanying text. 
 14. While governor of Illinois, Jim Edgar admitted that a unilateral cutback in business 
subsidies would be “just as unrealistic as it would be for the United States to have withdrawn 
unilaterally from the nuclear arms race.”  Jim Edgar, Are Economic Development Incentives 
Smart?, STATE GOV’T NEWS (Council of State Governments) (March 1993), reprinted in GREG 
LEROY, NO MORE CANDY STORE 14 (1994).  See also Chris Farrell, The Economic War Among 
the States: An Overview, THE REGION (June 1996), available at http://woodrow.mpls.frb.fed.us/ 
sylloge/econwar/farrel.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2001) (stating that a state’s unilateral act to 
limit development incentives would be “economically suicidal”). 
 15. See Jennifer L. Gilbert, Selling the City Without Selling Out: New Legislation on 
Development Incentives Emphasizes Accountability, 27 URB. LAW. 427, 446-47 (1995). 
 16. See GOOD JOBS FIRST, INSTITUTE ON TAXATION AND ECONOMIC POLICY, THE POLICY 
SHIFT TO GOOD JOBS: CITIES, STATES AND COUNTIES ATTACHING JOB QUALITY STANDARDS TO 
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES 1 (2000). 
 17. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. STATE FIN. & PRO. § 7-314 (1999). 
 18. See infra notes 160-83 and accompanying text. 
 19. Interview, Greg LeRoy: On Incentives and Accountability, 17 STATE TAX NOTES 837, 
838 (Sept. 30, 1999). 
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inevitable that a case will soon arise to challenge the legality and enforceability 
of these statutes.  This Comment will make a comparative survey of such 
legislation, discuss their relative economic and prudential merits and analyze 
the language of the provisions therein as to their practicability and 
constitutionality.  Part II of this Comment will provide background information 
to the study of development subsidies, concentrating on case studies that 
demonstrate a need for accountability legislation.  Part III will map out the 
landscape of such legislation, using examples from Arizona, Iowa, Indiana and 
Louisiana.  Part IV will discuss legal and empirical challenges to the 
enforceability of the statutes, including contractual challenges, the theory of 
regulatory capture, weaknesses in statutory construction, and, especially, the 
Dormant Commerce Clause, which this Comment will argue mandates, rather 
than undermines, accountability in development incentives.  Part V will 
conclude with a call to states and municipalities for continued self-
empowerment by seizing the opportunity to confront the traditional “prisoners’ 
dilemma” in interstate competition for location of businesses. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. History of Development Incentives 
The practice of granting public funds to private businesses to encourage 
development is nothing new in America’s history.  Between 1722 and 1776, in 
what has been called “a series of ‘shady land deal[s],’”20 the city of New York 
granted much of its waterfront property to the city’s richest and most powerful 
residents in exchange for restrictive covenants to build streets and develop the 
city’s port facilities, while ensuring public access to certain roads and docks.21  
Immediately after the formation of the union of American states, 
Massachusetts, Georgia and others courted businesses with public assistance to 
encourage growth in their underdeveloped economies.22  In the nineteenth 
century, Midwestern cities fought fiercely to subsidize railways and to become 
transportation and shipping hubs, and the federal government granted 
significant tracts of land to encourage the expansion westward.23 
 
 20. HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER 45 (G. Edward White ed., 
1983) (quoting Milton Klein, Introduction to THE INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR 30 (Milton Klein 
ed., 1959)). 
 21. Id. at 48-51. 
 22. See, e.g., OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH (rev. ed. 1969).  
In fact, early corporate charters, which conferred upon banks, factories and other groups of 
private individuals a quasi-governmental power to levy taxes on their members, provided a key 
form of indirect assistance to the economy when public coffers were already drained from pre-
revolutionary war debt.  See id. at 91-105. 
 23. See WILLIAM CRONON, NATURE’S METROPOLIS 63-74 (1991) (discussing the role of 
railroads in Chicago’s economic expansion). 
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Much of the modern policy toward state incentives to economic 
development began during the Great Depression, when tightened government 
control of economic matters gained favor over the laissez-faire approach of 
years past.24  Southern states instituted a series of programs which sought to 
lure businesses from the North with promises of subsidies, tax relief, facilities, 
training, and low-wage and non-unionized workers.25  Consistent with the 
tendency of development programs to sprout during emerging economies or 
times of economic crises, welfare programs reappeared in the 1970s and 1980s 
when the country’s energy crisis and consequent shift from industrial activity 
caused Northeastern and Midwestern cities to search for new incentives to 
dissuade businesses from leaving for “sun belt” states.26  During these decades, 
the state of Michigan particularly felt pressure to keep local jobs in the wake of 
threats by General Motors Corporation (“GM”) to relocate to more 
advantageous environs. 
B. The Michigan Example Part 1: The Poletown Case 
Perhaps the most demonstrative example of the competing tensions 
between the economic desperation of old, industrial cities and the desire for 
moderation and accountability in economic development incentives is the case 
of Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit.27  In 1980, GM 
announced its plan to close its Cadillac and Fisher body plants in Detroit in 
favor of a newer, more automated facility that could produce cars to compete 
with a wave of lightweight and fuel-economic imports.28  GM notified the city 
and offered to build the new facility in Detroit, employing 6,000 locals, if a 
suitable site could be found.29  The City of Detroit, faced with an 18% 
unemployment rate and a continuous exodus of manufacturers to “sun belt” 
states, acted quickly, giving GM a list of nine proposed sites.30  Only a 465-
 
 24. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 674. 
 25. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 14; Little, supra note 4, at 853.  In 1936, often credited as 
the first “shot fired” in the economic war between the states, the city of Durant, Mississippi 
issued $25,000 in industrial revenue bonds and erected a building for Real Silk Hosiery Mills.  
Nine years later, the city approved a bond of $60,000 to expand the facility.  Real Silk never 
employed more than 150 people locally and left Durant before its lease was up.  Mississippi 
remains the poorest state in the nation.  See “Durant, Mississippi: Where It All Began,” in Barlett 
& Steele, supra note 5. 
 26. Farrell, supra note 14. 
 27. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).  The razing of Poletown for construction of a new GM 
plant was documented in a documentary film, POLETOWN LIVES! (Information Factory 1983) (on 
file with the Saint Louis University Law Library, or available by contacting Information Factory, 
3512 Courville, Detroit, MI 48224), and in JEANIE WYLIE, POLETOWN: COMMUNITY BETRAYED 
(Illini Books ed. 1990). 
 28. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 460 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 465-67 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
252 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46:247 
acre site, which would require the condemnation of an entire community of 
first- and second-generation Polish Americans, was found adequate by GM.31 
Subsequent correspondence between GM and the economic development 
corporations of the cities of Detroit and neighboring Hamtramck demonstrates 
the extent of control which GM maintained over the terms and conditions of 
the project.32  These corporations were simply the “alter egos” of the 
municipalities they represented, chaired by the mayors of each city.33  By a 
series of memoranda, drafted by GM and left unaltered except for signatures 
by the municipalities, the City of Detroit was required to take title to the 
property within six months and make improvements to roads and utilities, at an 
eventual cost of over $200 million, then sell the property to GM for $8 
million.34  The two cities further agreed to grant GM the “maximum allowable 
tax abatement under [Michigan] law for a period of 12 years.”35 
Under Michigan’s “quick take” statute,36 the City of Detroit began the 
process of condemnation and compensating the owners of the Poletown 
properties.  Even though alternative architectural plans had been proposed that 
would have saved much of the homes therein, the city proceeded with notices 
of eviction to the owners of the neighborhood’s 1,400 homes, 144 businesses 
and 16 churches, many of which were to become landscaped lawns, ponds and 
parking surrounding the plant.37  A minority of residents resisted, filing suit to 
enjoin the condemnation proceedings and making as their headquarters the 
Immaculate Conception Church in Poletown.  However, despite the pleas of 
the church’s priest, Father Joseph Karasiewicz, the archdiocese of the Catholic 
Church sold the church for $1.3 million.38  Many local businesses soon 
followed.39  By the time the Poletown case reached the Michigan Supreme 
Court, which granted a motion for immediate consideration and an application 
for leave to appeal prior to a decision by the lower appellate court,40 the case’s 
conclusion was attended with an “overwhelming sense of inevitability.”41  By a 
3-2 decision, rendered within ten days of oral argument, the court held that the 
exercise of eminent domain for use by a private corporation carried the public 
 
 31. Id. at 467-68. 
 32. Id. at 468-71. 
 33. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 468-69 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
 34. Id. at 469. 
 35. Id. at 470. 
 36. MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 8.265(1)-(27) (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2000). 
 37. WYLIE, supra note 27, at 51-52. 
 38. Id. at 117. 
 39. Id. at 130. 
 40. Poletown, 304 N.W.2d at 457. 
 41. Id. at 481 (Ryan, J., dissenting). 
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purpose of revitalizing the local economy and hence was a valid exercise of 
police power under the Michigan constitution.42 
C. Rising Incentives and the Problem of Accountability 
The Poletown decision is consistent with judicial decisions in other states.  
Each of these courts generally ask whether the object sought to be 
accomplished by eminent domain is primarily for the benefit of the public as 
compared with the benefit to private interests.43  This “ends justify the means” 
analysis, combined with judicial deference to legislative determinations of 
“public purpose,” has meant that the acts of economic development agencies 
have gone virtually without judicial check for thirty years.44 
Given this free rein, development authorities have given out increasingly 
large incentive packages.  In 1994, Alabama offered a package to Mercedes-
Benz whereby it would clear and improve a factory site, upgrade utilities, buy 
2,500 of the vehicles produced, and train and pay the salaries of the workers 
for one year.45  Northwest Airlines received an incentive package from 
Minnesota in 1991 worth nearly $838 million.46  Michigan gave inducements 
totaling $80 million to Blue Water Fibre for a paper-recycling mill, at a cost of 
$2.4 million dollars per job.47  Furthermore, in 1995, Ohio and the City of 
Toledo put together an incentive package worth $262 million for a facility to 
keep Chrysler manufacturing Jeeps in Toledo, even though the new plant 
would employ over 700 fewer workers than before.48 
Meanwhile, recipients of incentive packages were not always living up to 
their end of the bargain.  As of 1996, Northwest had not yet completed two 
maintenance facilities, the target of fifty percent of Minnesota’s subsidy, even 
 
 42. See id. at 459.  Subsequent to the court’s decision, residents of Poletown occupied the 
Immaculate Conception Church in an illegal vigil.  The City turned off the church’s water and 
electricity, then raided the church with sixty members of a Special Weapons Assault Team 
(SWAT).  Twelve people were arrested, many of whom were in their seventies or older.  For his 
criticisms, Father Karasiewicz was effectively appointed to a position in the Catholic Church 
where he would no longer be able to speak to the masses.  See WYLIE, supra note 27, at 153-91. 
 43. See, e.g., State ex rel. Brown v. Warr Acres, 946 P.2d 1140, 1147-49 (Okla. 1997) 
(Kauger, C.J., concurring). 
 44. See Moss, supra note 3, at 118-26; Maready v. Winston-Salem, 467 S.E.2d 615, 626-27 
(N.C. 1996). 
 45. See David E. Buchholz, Mercedes-Benz: The Deal of the Century, available at 
http://www.cfed.org/main/econDev/bi/main/vignettes/mercedes.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).  
The Mercedes-Benz package would cost Alabama roughly $153 million, an expenditure of 
between $153,000 and $220,000 per job promised.  See id. 
 46. See Michael H. LaFave, Taking Back the Giveaways: Minnesota’s Corporate Welfare 
Legislation and the Search for Accountability, 80 MINN. L. REV. 1579, 1579 (1996). 
 47. See Farrell, supra note 14. 
 48. See David E. Buchholz, Toledo: Failing to Deliver, available at http://www.cfed.org/ 
main/econDev/bi/main/vignettes/toledocf.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2001). 
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though the facilities had been scheduled for completion three years earlier.49  
At the same time, the Mercedes plant in Alabama had cost the state nearly 
twice the anticipated amount, produced one-half the expected jobs, and only 
fourteen percent of the plant’s suppliers were located within Alabama 
borders.50  The Toledo plant, ultimately with the aid of tax incentives, was 
almost entirely automated, and the assembly of Jeeps by laser-guided robots 
resulted in the disappearance of an additional 2,800 jobs.51  Absent specific 
provisions in a contract or authorizing statute holding recipient businesses 
accountable for promises of jobs and economic growth made during 
negotiations, states and municipalities are quite often helpless against subsidy 
abuse.52 
D. The Michigan Example Part 2: The Willow Run Case 
A good example of the helplessness of some municipalities in negotiating 
incentive deals is the case of Charter Township of Ypsilanti v. General Motors 
Corp. (“Willow Run Case”).53  In 1984 and 1988, the township of Ypsilanti, 
Michigan, located just thirty miles from the Poletown plant, offered GM 
twelve-year property tax abatements for investments related to the production 
of a new car at its Willow Run plant.54  In its 1984 tax abatement application, 
GM stated that its investment would create 200 jobs and help retain 4,300 
more.55  Its 1988 application claimed 4,900 jobs would be retained by its 
 
 49. See LaFave, supra note 46, at 1580. 
 50. See Allen R. Myerson, O Governor, Won’t You Buy Me a Mercedes Plant?, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 1, 1996, at F1. 
 51. Gideon Kanner, The New Robber Barons, NAT’L L.J., May 21, 2001, at A19.  The 
Toledo package is currently being challenged in federal district court for its constitutionality, as 
discussed infra notes 102-103 and accompanying text. 
 52. See, e.g., Yonkers v. Otis Elevator Co., 649 F. Supp. 716, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (denying 
the city relief where a recipient of financial incentives had made no clear commitment to operate 
its plant for any period of time); In re Indenture of Trust, 437 N.W.2d 430, 436 (Minn. Ct. App. 
1989) (finding that an incentive agreement created no obligation upon the recipient to forbear 
from transferring jobs and equipment out of state). 
 53. 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993). 
 54. See id. at 558.  The tax abatements were made pursuant to Michigan’s Plant 
Rehabilitation and Industrial Development Districts Act.  MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 207.551-.571 
(LEXIS through 1994 legislation).  Under the Act, municipalities create industrial development 
districts, which allows companies within such districts to apply for exemptions with the city and 
state tax authorities.  From 1975 to 1990, General Motors received tax abatements on investments 
totaling more than $1.3 billion on its operations in Ypsilanti alone.  See Taylor, supra note 13, at 
676-77.  Michigan’s authorizing statute is weak on protections to the state, authorizing tax 
abatements that will “have the reasonable likelihood to create employment, retain employment, 
prevent a loss of employment, or produce energy in the community in which the facility is 
situated.”  MICH. COMP. LAWS § 207.559(2)(e) (emphasis added). 
 55. See Scott J. Ziance, Making Economic Development Incentives More Efficient, 30 URB. 
LAW. 33, 36 (1998). 
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investment.56  In negotiations, GM pledged to continue production and 
maintain employment at the plant, subject to “favorable market demand.”57  In 
1991, when GM decided to move its Willow Run operations to Arlington, 
Texas, the township sued for injunctive relief.58 
The trial court granted such relief, finding no contract in the authorizing 
statute or tax abatement applications, but finding GM was bound by 
promissory estoppel to remain at the Willow Run plant.59  It concluded that it 
would be grossly unfair if GM, having “lulled the people of the Ypsilanti area 
into giving up millions of tax dollars which they so desperately need to educate 
their children,” was allowed to move its operations built with tax assistance 
“simply . . . because it thinks it can make these same cars cheaper somewhere 
else.”60  On appeal, however, the decision was reversed.  Holding that 
representations of job retention made during hearings and negotiations were 
nothing more than “hyperbole and puffery,” the Michigan Court of Appeals 
overturned the injunction on a clearly erroneous standard.61  As the court 
noted, “[i]t has never been held that an abatement carries [inherently] a 
promise of continued employment.”62 
The Willow Run Case was frequently discussed by commentators.63  It 
demonstrates that development incentives, by themselves, do nothing to 
alleviate the problem of businesses leaving dependent communities in favor of 
more profitable business climates.64  Absent a statutory or contractual 
provision holding the recipient legally accountable, the recipient business can 
still relocate at any point. 
E. The Economic Debate 
Numerous studies indicate that businesses do not decide where to invest on 
the basis of development incentives.65  Moreover, there are indications that 
such incentives have no net benefit to the individual communities that provide 
 
 56. See id. 
 57. Willow Run Case, 506 N.W.2d at 558. 
 58. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 36. 
 59. See Willow Run Case, 506 N.W.2d at 558. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 559. 
 62. Id. at 561. 
 63. See, e.g., David L. Gregory, Company Closings and Community Consequences, 72 U. 
DET. MERCY L. REV. 1 (1994); Ziance, supra note 55, at 36-38; Gilbert, supra note 15, at 449-50; 
Annett Pinckney, Tax Abatements and Industrial Location: Township of Ypsilanti, Mich. v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 59 TAX NOTES 1537 (1993); Moss, supra note 3, at 126-28. 
 64. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 37. 
 65. See Peter O’Brien, The Automotive Industry: The Permanent Revolution, in INDUSTRY 
ON THE MOVE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTERNATIONAL RELOCATION IN THE 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY 53, 81 (G. van Liemt ed., 1992); Moss, supra note 3, at 109. 
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them.66  For example, Louisiana granted tax exemptions that cost its school 
system $941 million during the 1980s.67  During the same period, it remained 
among the lowest ranking states in adult literacy and average teacher pay,68 
and was one of the slowest growing states in terms of personal income.69  
South Carolina, meanwhile, has added 200,000 jobs since 1990 via a series of 
“sweetheart” tax breaks to companies, but remains dead last in high school 
SAT scores, retains four homes in ten that are unconnected to sewers, and 
maintains a strained tax base that allows little leeway in improvement to the 
public infrastructure.70  Finally, Alabama, whose multimillion-dollar courting 
of a Mercedes plant as discussed supra, is last in elementary and secondary 
school spending.71 
The failure of these southern states to bolster their local economies by the 
use of development incentives may not be because the incentives, in a vacuum, 
fail to stimulate investment decisions.  Rather, low-performing states are often 
unable to outbid wealthier states for development projects in a competitive 
environment where all states are willing to spend public dollars to encourage 
private investment.72  Given the relative inability of development incentives to 
redistribute capital into under-performing economies and the widespread 
public sentiment against welfare generally, one is left to wonder why states and 
municipalities engage in bidding wars for industry location at all. 
The traditional explanation is that they do so out of necessity; that if they 
did not offer companies incentive packages, another locality would, luring 
away vital businesses.  The problem is often described by the “prisoners’ 
dilemma” analogy.73  In the prisoner’s dilemma, two co-conspirators to a crime 
are interrogated independently by the authorities, who try to get confessions 
from each implicating the other.  Because each prisoner faces the stiffest 
sentence if he remains silent and the other confesses, each one confesses out of 
fear that the other will first.  Thus, two prisoners who share the common goal 
of testimonial silence and subsequent acquittal, each compromise their best 
interest when thrown into competition with one another.74 
 
 66. See generally GJF Audit Survey, supra note 7, at 35-41. 
 67. See Moss, supra note 3, at 110. 
 68. See id. 
 69. See DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, REVISED STATE 
ESTIMATES FOR PERSONAL INCOME 1969-1998 (1999). 
 70. Jay Hancock, S.C. Pays Dearly for Added Jobs, BALT. SUN, Oct. 12, 1999, at A1 (citing 
a study by the Strom Thurmond Institute of Clemson University). 
 71. See Myerson, supra note 50. 
 72. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 6 (citing PETER S. FISHER & ALAN H. PETERS, 
INDUSTRIAL INCENTIVES: COMPETITION AMONG AMERICAN STATES AND CITIES 26 (1998)). 
 73. See, e.g., Schaefer, supra note 13, at 311-12; Taylor, supra note 13, at 693; Little, supra 
note 4, at 858-59. 
 74. For a thorough discussion of the prisoner’s dilemma, see R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD 
RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS: INTRODUCTION AND CRITICAL SURVEY 94-97 (1957). 
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The analogy to the “economic war among the states” is clear.75  Although 
states and municipalities will always be in competition for business, they 
would enjoy the maximum economic benefit if such competition were based 
on quality of education and public works, fiscal stability and regulatory 
predictability rather than direct financial assistance.76  Most negotiations 
between localities and businesses for location incentive packages happen 
behind closed doors and without the knowledge of other competing localities.77  
Thus, the local and state governments are forced to offer special treatment out 
of fear that failure to do so will render them at a competitive disadvantage in 
the economic development game.78 
The aggregate economic impact of this competition is a shift in wealth 
from labor to capital, from individuals to corporations or from the public realm 
to private concerns.79  First, at least a portion of the state revenues allocated to 
capital investment would presumably otherwise have been spent for some 
purpose that benefited labor—perhaps health care, education or social 
security.80  Second, that portion of state or local revenue which would have 
derived from the cash, taxes or other resources being forfeited via the 
development incentive must either be borne elsewhere, in the form of higher 
property or sales taxes, or result in a reduction of public goods and services.81  
 
 75. Burstein & Rolnick, supra note 13. 
 76. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 693. 
 77. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1505.07(K) (West 1999) (requiring that all 
information provided in applications for public assistance be kept confidential); CAL. GOV. CODE 
§ 6254.15 (West Supp. 2001) (exempting from the Freedom of Information Act disclosure 
information provided in connection with a subsidy proposal).  The confidentiality of these 
negotiations creates the potential for “whipsawing,” or using the possibility of more attractive 
offers from competing states to drive up the negotiated value of incentive packages.  See Moss, 
supra note 3, at 132.  For example, in 1992 and 1993, staff of Intel Corporation visited six 
southwestern states with prepared reports asking for tax credits, relocation assistance, employee 
training and other perks as inducements to locate a new semiconductor fabrication plant in that 
state.  See John Howe & Mark Vallianatos, Making Corporations Accountable Through 
Legislative Initiatives, in PUBLIC SUBSIDIES, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 43, 45 (Grassroots Policy 
Project 1998).  By playing one state against another, Intel eventually landed a deal in Rio Rancho, 
New Mexico that garnered them a thirty-year tax exemption and other perks worth nearly $300 
million.  See Intel: A Cautionary Tale?, available at http://www.cfed.org/main/econDev/bi/main/ 
case_studies/Intel.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2001).  In response to this practice, some districts have 
enacted “right to know” laws, which require that agency review of information given in 
connection with applications for financial assistance be reported to the public.  See Howe & 
Vallianatos, supra, at 44 (discussing the “right to know” element of the Boston living wage 
ordinance). 
 78. See Merrill Goozner, Governments Rethink Corporate Tax Breaks, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 14, 
2000, at N1. 
 79. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 4. 
 80. See id. at 17 n.11. 
 81. See Peter Enrich, Business Tax Incentives: A Status Report (AALS Paper Draft July 24, 
2001) (on file with the author). 
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Indeed, corporate income taxes as a percentage of nationwide tax revenue 
decreased in the United States from 20.3% in 1955 to 9.6% in 1996.82  
Moreover, while a jurisdiction to which a recipient business relocates may be 
able to claim a net increase to its tax base from that single transaction, any 
such increase is a fortiori less than the decrease to the tax base in the 
jurisdiction from which the recipient business departs, so long as the new 
jurisdiction was offering more than the former was already giving.83  As the 
economic development game is played nationwide, or even globally, the 
movement of capital from one jurisdiction to another ultimately does not 
collectively increase the number of taxable sources of income, but instead 
depletes the competing jurisdictions’ collective ability to provide public goods 
and services. 
Economists willing to defend development incentives generally do so on 
two grounds.  First, some argue that multi-state bidding for investment is not a 
“race to the bottom,” but is itself an efficient system whereby the participant 
jurisdictions will only bid up to the point at which marginal benefits, such as 
the increased tax revenue from additional jobs, no longer exceed the marginal 
cost, including the incentive itself as well as the cost of additional public 
services.84  Meanwhile, recipient businesses would only relocate when the 
incentive package and resultant synergies exceed the relocation costs, and the 
intersection of these two curves would supply a static price toward which 
negotiating parties would tend to gravitate, a static price that ultimately results 
in the taxing of capital investment at an economically optimal level.  This 
argument, however, ignores the possibility of governors, mayors, councilmen 
and development officials factoring into the equation the political benefit from 
luring a high-profile industry during their tenures, as well as the vast 
informational asymmetry that develops when a private firm with confidential 
information regarding actual costs and future strategies negotiates with a 
public agency whose activities must be disclosed.85 
The actual practice of development agencies, in fact, rarely involves an 
effective evaluation of the economic costs and benefits from a particular 
development incentive; nor is there commonly a consideration of the 
likelihood of the recipient business relocating into the community absent the 
incentive.86  Thus, the actual practice of these agencies seriously undermines 
the second defense of development incentives proffered by some economists—
that efficiencies are created when the superior local knowledge of development 
 
 82. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 8. 
 83. See Burstein & Rolnick, supra note 13. 
 84. See, e.g., Gillette, supra note 8, at 488-93; see generally Dan Black & William Hoyt, 
Bidding for Firms, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 1249 (1989). 
 85. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 5; see also supra note 77 (discussing “whipsawing”). 
 86. See GJF Audit Survey, supra note 7, at 36-41. 
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agencies serves to match industries with their most productive and synergistic 
jurisdiction.87  Case studies indicate that these synergies are rarely sought, 
much less achieved.  For example, in 1994, the city of Amarillo, Texas 
indiscriminately sent a check in the amount of $8 million to about 1,300 
businesses nationwide, payable in the event that the recipient created 700 jobs 
in the city.88  Therefore, even if competition for business in the form of 
development incentives is theoretically defensible, the unrestrained practice of 
development agencies has been such that predictions of inefficiency and public 
fiscal problems will be more on target. 
F. Proposed Alternative Solutions to the Economic War Among the States 
Many commentators have proposed judicial and legislative solutions to the 
problem of competition in bidding on business location decisions. 
1. Invalidation by the Commerce Clause 
Some have claimed that the Commerce Clause89 may operate as a restraint 
on state activity in bidding wars.90  By construction, the Commerce Clause 
operates negatively as a limitation on state power to regulate or otherwise 
interfere with interstate commerce, even in the absence of congressional 
action.91  When state legislation conflicts with the clause’s purpose of 
protecting a national common market, it becomes subject to judicial review as 
to whether its burden on interstate commerce outweighs the local interest in the 
particular legislation.92  If that burden is clearly excessive, the law will be 
struck down.93 
Arguably, Commerce Clause jurisprudence would play its intended role by 
“preventing the harmful consequences of competitive state efforts to distort the 
national economy for parochial ends.”94  The doctrine as it stands now 
invalidates laws that propagate “economic protectionism” by discriminating 
against out-of-state interests in favor of local ones.95  In fact, there exists a long 
line of Supreme Court decisions invalidating state tax laws that discriminate 
against interstate commerce by giving preferential treatment to in-state 
 
 87. See Gillette, supra note 8, at 485. 
 88. See Jane Seaberry, Amarillo Lures Businesses with $8 Million Checks, DALLAS 
MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 1994, at D1. 
 89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“the Congress shall have Power . . . to regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”). 
 90. See generally Enrich, supra note 3; Walter Hellerstein & Dan Coenen, Commerce 
Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 789 (1996). 
 91. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977). 
 92. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 93. See id. 
 94. Enrich, supra note 3, at 468. 
 95. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470 (1981). 
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economic activity.96  Though development incentives are specifically targeted, 
their statutory authority often makes incentives available to any corporation 
meeting certain minimum requirements and willing to relocate within the 
state.97  Investment tax credits, which give a direct tax savings for every dollar 
of in-state investment, are often cited as the paradigmatic example of a 
constitutionally impermissible development incentive.98 
Other development incentives, such as direct subsidies, may distort the 
market in favor of a particular in-state enterprise, but they do so at the equal 
exclusion of other in-state and out-of-state businesses.  Even if that constitutes 
preferential treatment to in-state interests, the state is attempting to foster local 
welfare only by spending the financial resources of its residents.99  Property tax 
exemptions also seem particularly insulated because nonresidents would not be 
subject to the tax in the first place.  At present, the Supreme Court has yet to 
decide the issue,100 primarily because the class of plaintiffs with standing to 
challenge development incentives, namely interstate businesses, are the 
primary beneficiaries of such incentives.101 
The theory was, however, recently debated in a federal district court, 
where a consortium of concerned individuals and small businesses challenged 
the grant by Ohio and the city of Toledo of a $280 million incentive package to 
retain a Jeep manufacturing plant, now operated by DaimlerChrysler, Inc., at 
its current location.102  The tax provisions challenged, in particular, include a 
credit against Ohio’s corporate excise tax and a property tax abatement on the 
 
 96. See, e.g., South Central Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999) (holding that a 
state franchise tax scheme that allowed domestic corporations to reduce the par value of their 
stock while denying foreign corporations the same opportunity impermissibly discriminated 
against interstate commerce); Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 
(1997) (striking down a Maine property tax exemption restricted to organizations that served 
primarily in-state interests); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996) (invalidating state tax 
scheme requiring shareholders in foreign corporations to pay a tax on a higher percentage of their 
stock’s value than shareholders in exclusively domestic corporations); Assoc. Indus. of Mo. v. 
Lohman, 511 U.S. 641 (1994) (invalidating one-time Missouri use tax imposed on personal 
property purchased outside the state in all political subdivisions where the use tax exceeded the 
intrastate sales tax). 
 97. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. art. 83A, § 5-1102 (2000) (providing an automatic income tax 
credit to any certified business that creates or expands an in-state business facility that results in 
the creation of sixty or more jobs in specified industries). 
 98. See Enrich, supra note 3, at 434-37; Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 90, at 817-18. 
 99. See Gillette, supra note 8, at 482. 
 100. See West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 199 n.15 (1994) (“We have never 
squarely confronted the constitutionality of subsidies, and we need not do so now.  We have, 
however, noted that ‘direct subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul’ of 
the negative Commerce Clause.”) (citations omitted). 
 101. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 323. 
 102. See Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1198 (N.D. Ohio 2001). 
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plant’s machinery and equipment.103  In any event, and without immediately 
passing on the merits of the Toledo claim, this Comment will presume that at 
least one relocation incentive would pass constitutional muster for the purpose 
of demonstrating the problems with applying current Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence to recent accountability legislation, as will be done in Part IV, 
infra. 
2. A Federal Legislative Response 
Given the Commerce Clause’s purpose in protecting the economic unity of 
our nation,104 there seems to be a federal interest in constraining the use of 
industrial location subsidies.  Such a constraint could be effectuated in many 
ways: by conditioning federal grants upon limiting the use of location 
subsidies,105 by imposing an excise tax upon the subsidies106 or by creating a 
private right of action similar to that which exists under antitrust law.107  
Representative David Minge of Minnesota recently proposed the Distorting 
Subsidies Limitation Act,108 which would require that grants or tax deferrals be 
taxed at the same rates that currently apply to other corporate income.109  
While the House Budget Committee held a hearing on this bill and other 
concerns relating to unnecessary business subsidies,110 the bill remains in 
committee. 
3. International Trade Agreements 
Multilateral trade agreements, such as the proposed Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (hereinafter, “MAI”) and the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (hereinafter, “NAFTA”) may limit economic development 
incentives as they are currently used in practice.111  These agreements forbid 
certain laws that put foreign investors at a commercial disadvantage in relation 
to domestic investors.112As such, the test of discriminatory effect under 
NAFTA and MAI is stricter than the scrutiny given development incentives 
 
 103. See id.  Though the original complaint was dismissed by the District Court, that 
dismissal is currently on appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 
 104. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 537 (1940). 
 105. See Taylor, supra note 13, at 710-12 (providing an example of such a model statute). 
 106. See Little, supra note 4, at 891. 
 107. See id. at 890-91. 
 108. H.R. 1060, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 109. See id. 
 110. See Unnecessary Business Subsidies, Hearing Before the Committee on the Budget of the 
House of Representatives, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 111. See GEORGETOWN LAW CENTER AND CORPORATION FOR ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT, 
FEDERALISM AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE EMERGING CONFLICT BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS AND TRADITIONAL STATE/LOCAL AUTHORITY 3 (Apr. 1999 draft). 
 112. See id. at 7. 
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under the Dormant Commerce Clause.113  Furthermore, the Uruguay Round 
Subsidies Agreement,114 negotiated under the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade, would constrain domestic subsidies that are targeted at one or a 
limited group of specific enterprises.115  A thorough discussion of the impact of 
these agreements is beyond the scope of this Comment.116  Considering the 
fact, however, that these agreements must be enforced by member nations, and 
that the discriminatory impact of the location incentives thereunder must be 
international in scope, there is little reason to believe these international 
agreements will have a dramatic impact on local economic development 
activity.117 
4. State Regulation and Multilateral Agreements 
As discussed before, states and municipalities perceive themselves in a 
prisoner’s dilemma whereby limitation and regulation of subsidy arrangements 
would render them at a competitive disadvantage in the market for location of 
businesses.118 An often-suggested strategy for curbing development bidding 
has been to negotiate a noncompetition agreement among the states.119  During 
the 1970s, Michigan Governor William Milliken called for such a compact.  
Several midwestern states attempted a similar regional agreement in 1988.120  
In October of 1991, Connecticut, New Jersey and New York signed a pact 
agreeing to end attempts at luring businesses from each other.121  To date, 
however, there has been no legal action taken under this agreement, despite 
frequent relocation of businesses among the states involving significant 
incentive packages.122  It does not appear likely that a binding agreement 
among the fifty states will be negotiated anytime soon.123 
 
 113. See id. 
 114. AGREEMENT ON SUBSIDIES AND COUNTERVAILING MEASURES, H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, 
at 1533 (1994). 
 115. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 327-31 (stating that most location incentives would fail 
to meet the criteria of the Uruguay Round Subsidies Agreement). 
 116. For a more thorough discussion of the relationship between international agreements and 
economic development incentives, see MORRIS L. SWEET, REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION AND NORTH AMERICA (1999). 
 117. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 331. 
 118. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text. 
 119. See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 446. 
 120. See id.  See also Little, supra note 4, at 875-76. 
 121. See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 447; Schaefer, supra note 13, at 322. 
 122. See Schaefer, supra note 13, at 321. 
 123. See id. at 322-23.  Furthermore, such an agreement may violate the Compact Clause of 
the Constitution.  U.S. CONST.  art. I, §10, cl. 3  (“No State shall, without the Consent of 
Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State”).  The Compact Clause 
prohibits agreements that encroach upon federal power or increase the political power of the 
states.  See United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm., 434 U.S. 452, 466-70 (1978). 
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III.  LEGISLATION 
Considering the difficulties in negotiating a nationwide non-competition 
agreement, the unlikelihood of federal intervention and the lack of precedent 
for a suit enjoining subsidies under the Commerce Clause, it is not surprising 
that states and municipalities have begun to look for local legislative solutions 
to the problem of unchecked competition for investment.  One effective 
rallying point for critics of the current practice of development agencies has 
been the adoption of what has generally been termed “accountability 
legislation,” that is, legislation that attaches minimum employment, wage, 
tenancy or other standards to incentive packages.124  Indeed, in the last twenty 
years, at least fifty-six cities, counties and states have passed provisions125 that 
often allow for the reclamation of the value of the tax abatement or other 
assistance if the recipient fails to meet certain performance requirements.126  
The advantage of these measures is that they may be implemented 
unilaterally127 with little apparent harm to the perceived business climate of the 
community enacting them.128  The trend toward using accountability measures 
in incentive packages has been described as a turning point in the cutthroat 
interstate battle for business.129 
Accountability legislation seeks to ensure that public investment in private 
companies yield public benefits.130  As such, it has the potential to address 
some of the political problems that undermine economic defenses to location 
incentives.131  There are three categories of accountability legislation: (1) 
“right to know” laws that grant public access to information regarding 
incentive application and grants; (2) laws that set minimum standards for 
corporations qualifying for public assistance; and (3) laws with provisions that 
enforce these standards by allowing the state or municipality to recoup its 
 
 124. See Enrich, supra note 81. 
 125. See Goozner, supra note 78. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 429. 
 128. Telephone Interview with Greg LeRoy, Director, Good Jobs First, a project of the 
Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (Oct. 24, 2000).  For example, Arlington, Texas, the 
beneficiary of the GM move discussed in The Willow Run Case, was able to attract the plant 
despite a somewhat stringent contract governing the incentive.  See Ziance, supra note 55, at 41.  
See also Kary L. Moss et al., Legal Strategies to Achieve Tax Subsidy Accountability, in PUBLIC 
SUBSIDIES, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 58-76, 74 n.10 (Grassroots Policy Project 1998). 
 129. See Michael Phillips, Localities Force Firms to Keep Promises, WALL ST. J., June 26, 
1996, at A2. 
 130. See LaFave, supra note 46, at 1590.  See also Declaration of Policy, IOWA ACTS 1994 
(75 G.A.) ch. 1008 §1 (declaring that “[p]ublic subsidies should be in the form of investments in 
people, resulting in a better educated and skilled workforce,” and that “[t]he state owes it to its 
citizens to ensure that all development agreements include provisions for recouping subsidies 
when businesses fail to meet [their] obligation [of delivering on promised benefits]”). 
 131. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. 
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investment.132  This section will discuss a few samples of these laws, 
specifically those that set standards to be incorporated into incentive 
agreements and include a means of enforcing such standards.133  Relevant 
inquiries, to be made in Part IV of this Comment, include the specificity with 
which the statute addresses future contingencies, the extent of the discretion 
given local development authorities in defining contractual terms and 
conditions and the extent to which these conditions burden interstate 
commerce. 
A. Iowa’s New Jobs and Income Act 
Under Iowa’s New Jobs and Income Act,134 development incentives may 
be in the form of an investment tax credit, a tax exemption for machinery and 
equipment, a community property tax exemption or other benefits.  The 
recipient business must demonstrate, prior to receiving benefits and subject to 
approval by the community where the business is located, that it (1) has not 
closed or substantially reduced operations in another area of the state to 
relocate, (2) will provide 80% of the cost of medical and dental care for its 
full-time employees, (3) will pay a median wage of at least eleven dollars per 
hour (indexed to 1993 dollars) or 130 percent of a county-wide median wage, 
(4) will make a minimum investment of $10 million (indexed to 1993 dollars) 
and (5) will create at least fifty (and sometimes seventy-five) jobs.135  Failure 
to comply with performance requirements may subject the recipient to 
penalties or require that recipient repay the assistance according to a calibrated 
scale based on the percentage of requirements met.136 
B. Arizona’s Standards for Eligibility for Economic Development Assistance 
Arizona’s economic development accountability law137 is an example of a 
weaker and more discretionary statutory construction.  Under Arizona law, the 
state’s Economic Development Commission selects candidates for financial 
 
 132. See Howe & Vallianatos, supra note 77, at 43-44. 
 133. For examples of such accountability laws not discussed herein, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 12-217(m) (West 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-5(a) (West 1997); 20 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 655/5.5 (West 1993); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.24-010 to -150, and §§ 
154.26-010 to 154.26-100 (Michie 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 13070-J to 13070-M 
(West 1996, supp. 2000); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 5215 (West 1996); MD. CODE ANN., 
STATE FIN. & PROC. § 7-314 (2000); MD. ANN. CODE art. 83A, § 5-1102 (1999); MINN. STAT. § 
116J.994 (1998); NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-4107 (1996); S.B. A03325, 1999-2000 Reg. Session 
(N.Y. 1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 122.17 (West 1996); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-439 (Michie 
1998). 
 134. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 15.326-.337 (West 1995). 
 135. See id. § 15.329(1). 
 136. See id. § 15.330.  See also Gilbert, supra note 15, at 484-85. 
 137. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1505.07 (West 1999). 
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assistance projects based on a number of factors, including (1) the anticipated 
resulting increase in the state’s tax base, (2) the extent of public benefit, (3) the 
wages to be paid, (4) the number of jobs created, (5) the comparative cost of 
the project, (6) the percent of products being sold out of state and (7) any 
related benefits.138  No single factor is dispositive and no minimum amounts 
are mandated, except that assistance may not exceed fifty percent of the 
estimated increase in tax revenue directly or indirectly deriving from the 
transaction.139  The recipient business must enter into a memorandum of 
understanding with certain discretionary minimum standards that allow the 
commission, at its instance, to stop, readjust or recapture all or part of the 
state’s investment.140 
C. Indiana’s Economic Development for a Growing Economy Tax Credit 
Indiana’s Economic Development for a Growing Economy Tax Credit141 
authorizes a credit for investments that are economically sound, create new 
jobs, will have an overall positive fiscal impact for the state, that are actively 
being courted by other states and for which there exists a disparity between the 
cost of locating in Indiana and the cost of locating in the competing state.142  
Recipients must enter into a tax credit agreement, which requires that average 
wages of the employees of the qualifying business exceed the average wages in 
the county in which the project is located, and that operations must be 
maintained at that location for at least two times the number of years in the 
term of the tax credit.143  While the terms of required agreements in Indiana are 
stricter than under Arizona law, the tax commissioner retains discretion as to 
whether to enforce the agreement, and the amount received in return may not 
exceed the total amount of the credit.144 
D. Louisiana’s Quality Jobs Program Act 
Louisiana’s Quality Jobs Program Act145 states its purpose as “an 
inducement to locate in Louisiana for any business operation that does not 
have to be located in Louisiana in order to profitably and rationally conduct its 
business.”146  The Act creates an incentive tax credit to be given for up to ten 
 
 138. See id. § 41-1505.07(B). 
 139. See id. § 41-1505.07(D). 
 140. See id. § 41-1505.07(H). 
 141. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3.1-13 (West 1996). 
 142. See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 483. 
 143. See id. at 483-84. 
 144. See id. at 483-84. 
 145. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2451 et seq. (West 2001). 
 146. Id. § 51: 2452. 
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years147 to qualifying businesses engaged in a “basic industry” and calculated 
according to a complex formula.148  Qualifying businesses must contract with 
the state, subject to approval by the governor,149 to pay its employees (eighty 
percent of which should be employed full-time) an average of one and one-half 
times the minimum wage, with a total gross payroll of new jobs to exceed one 
million dollars within three years of contracting with the state.150  Failure to 
meet the gross payroll requirement within three years will result in an increase 
in the recipient’s tax liability in the amount of any credits previously taken.151  
After qualification and the filing of an initial report,152 the incentive tax credit 
is self-executing.  It is notable that the Louisiana tax credit calculation 
considers cost to the state in the formula, as the credit is a percentage of the 
estimated tax revenue resulting from the new jobs created, minus the state 
costs in the form of education and social services incident to those jobs.153 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
Thus far, there are only a few isolated incidents of states and localities 
using accountability statutes and clawback provisions to recoup their 
investment when recipients fail to live up to their end of the bargain.154  In 
1996, New York City recovered $60,000 from Bank of America when it 
transported equipment out-of-state that had been purchased with a city sales 
tax exemption.155  At the same time, Indianapolis had publicly expressed an 
intent to recover tax abatements from companies that had failed to maintain 
their qualification for the tax break.156  Since the majority of these statutes 
have been recently enacted,157 it is far too early to declare them a success or 
failure.  A predictive analysis of future incentive deals, however, based on the 
provisions of the enabling legislation, may be derived from principles of 
contract law, constitutional law and political and economic theory. 
 
 147. See id. § 51:2454(A)-(B) (providing for a five-year initial contract and the possibility for 
a five-year renewal). 
 148. See id. § 51:2455.  The term “basic industry” is defined at § 51:2453(1)(a) of the Act and 
includes transportation, construction, communications, equipment rental, computer-related 
services, medical services and engineering and architectural services. 
 149. See id. § 51:2454(A). 
 150. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:2455(E). 
 151. See id. § 51:2457(B). 
 152. See id. § 51:2457(A). 
 153. See id. §§ 51:2453(2)-(5), 51:2455. 
 154. See Howe & Vallianatos, supra note 77, at 55. 
 155. See id. 
 156. See Phillips, supra note 129, at A2. 
 157. See Accountability Legislation, in PUBLIC SUBSIDIES, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 88-96 
app. (Grassroots Policy Project 1998). 
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A. Contractual Provisions 
As noted above, and demonstrated by The Willow Run Case,158 the success 
of these accountability statutes will depend in part on the specificity and 
enforceability of the legislative or contractual provisions that legally enable the 
use of incentives.  Contractual provisions are always available to the municipal 
lawyer who wishes to condition an incentive package on compliance by the 
recipient with certain terms.  They offer the added flexibility of tailoring each 
incentive deal to the particular needs of the parties.  But absent a statutory 
provision requiring a minimum of accountability, economic development 
authorities have not shown much enthusiasm in using contracts to ensure 
performance.159 
1. Recalibrations 
Incentive deals can be given teeth in several ways.  First, the amount given 
may be recalibrated upon the occurrence of a specified event; that is, the 
amount of the assistance would be adjusted to reflect actual performance or 
changing business conditions.160  Recalibrations may be de novo, in that future 
expected benefits, but not past performance, will be used as the basis for 
recalculating the amount of assistance given.161  Alternatively, contracts or 
statutes may provide for a recalibration with clawbacks, which would adjust 
future subsidies to recover overpayment based on past performance.162  For 
example, under Louisiana’s Quality Jobs Program Act,163 the recipient 
business’s tax credit will be reduced in proportion to the extent the recipient 
fails to meet certain gross payroll requirements.164  Another, more gentle 
variation on the recalibrated incentive is the “ratcheted recalibration,” which 
adjusts the subsidy gradually, in order to give the recipient business time to 
adjust to the financial impact of the decrease in assistance.165 
So long as all of the possible triggering events are accounted for in the 
contract or enabling legislation, recalibrations may be the least problematic 
accountability provision doctrinally, as well as the least abhorrent to recipient 
businesses.166  However, provisions considering future contingencies may be 
 
 158. See supra notes 57-62 and accompanying text. 
 159. See Kary L. Moss et al., Legal Strategies to Achieve Tax Subsidy Accountability, in 
PUBLIC SUBSIDIES, PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 58, 59 (Grassroots Policy Project 1998) 
(discussing a survey by the Sugar Law Center for Economic & Social Justice that found most 
development programs using contracts were required to do so by statute). 
 160. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 42. 
 161. See id. at 43. 
 162. See id. 
 163. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2451-:2461 (West 2001). 
 164. See supra text accompanying notes 151 and 153. 
 165. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 43. 
 166. See id. 
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difficult to draft.167  More importantly, the dependence of these provisions on 
future in-state activity may render them useless in the event a recipient wants 
to leave the state entirely.  For example, Louisiana’s calibrated reduction in tax 
credits would do little to curb a business from leaving in the event the 
company was not realizing overall profits. 
2. Rescissions 
A legislature may also direct, or delegate to a development authority the 
power to direct, that a public assistance contract be rescinded or cancelled 
upon the occurrence of a certain specified event.168  As with any contractual 
provision, this cancellation must be assented to by both parties and should be 
clearly drafted.  For example, Illinois’ High Impact Business tax credit169 
provides for automatic cancellation if it is determined that the recipient would 
have relocated to Illinois absent the tax credit or if the recipient otherwise fails 
to comply with the terms and conditions of the statute.170  Once again, these 
provisions do little to curb a relocating business that has no intention of 
reaping the future benefits of in-state activities in any event, but they may 
prevent a state from sinking substantial amounts of money into a failing 
venture. 
3. Clawbacks 
The most widely utilized enforcement mechanism in new accountability 
legislation has been clawbacks.171  While the term “clawback” is sometimes 
used to describe any type of subsidy accountability measure,172 as used in this 
section it refers specifically to those provisions which enable a state or locality 
to recapture all or part of the cost of its investment without regard to future 
activity.  For reasons discussed in the following two paragraphs, clawback 
provisions must be carefully drafted to avoid a judicial designation as 
liquidated damages.173  Typically this is done by referring to the recaptured 
amount as a “payment” rather than “damages,”174 or by reinforcing the 
 
 167. See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 466-73 (describing the problems related to the enforcement 
of a Louisiana provision that tied a property tax exemption to certain environmental factors). 
 168. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 41. 
 169. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 655/5.5 (West 1993). 
 170. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 655/5.5(f). 
 171. See, e.g., Appendix, Accountability Legislation, in PUBLIC SUBSIDIES, PUBLIC 
ACCOUNTABILITY 88-96 (Grassroots Policy Project 1998) (charting at least 25 state and local 
laws that include a clawback provision as a necessary condition to the granting of business 
assistance). 
 172. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 3, at 138. 
 173. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 42. 
 174. Id. 
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ongoing nature of the contract by requiring repayment on a sliding scale; that 
is, requiring less to be repaid the longer the business remains in the state.175 
For example, Iowa’s New Jobs and Income Act176 provides for a calibrated 
system of recapture in the event that a recipient business fails to create a 
certain number of new jobs to be negotiated by the development authority but 
not less than fifty.177  In no event does the amount to be repaid exceed the 
amount given in assistance.  Similarly, Indiana’s clawback statute, the 
Economic Development for a Growing Economy Tax Credit,178 limits 
assessments against the recipient to the amount received in assistance.179  The 
assessments, however, are discretionary and made only upon the request of the 
director of the Commerce Department.180  This provides the authorized agency 
with a significant amount of leeway to decide which non-compliant businesses 
should be sanctioned, but also gives no assurances as to enforcement. 
4. Liquidated Damages and Penalties 
Certain accountability measures provide for a monetary fee to be paid in 
the event of default.  Under contract law, these penalties will not be enforced if 
classified as such by a court.181  Rather, to be an enforceable liquidation of 
contractual damages, the amount to be paid “must be a reasonable estimate, at 
the time of contracting,” of the damages likely to result from a breach, and the 
estimate must be shown as necessary due to the difficulty in measuring 
damages “after the breach occurs.”182  In the case of location incentives, the 
difficulty in quantifying damages should be found where secondary losses 
exist, such as those from incident businesses that fail when a vital economic 
industry moves away.183  However, development authorities and legislatures 
must consider the reasonableness of the estimate when drafting penalty and 
clawback clauses.  For example, where a clawback is scaled according to the 
percentage of performance completed under the contract and the recipient 
business is an industry of the type that is an integral part of the local economy, 
it is less likely that a court will refuse to enforce the provision as a penalty. 
 
 175. See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 460. 
 176. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 15.326-.337 (West 2000). 
 177. Id. § 15.330.  Specifically, the statute provides that a business shall repay one-quarter of 
the assistance given if it meets between 75 and 90 percent of the expected job quota, and one-half 
of the assistance given if it meets between 50 and 75 per cent of the expected job quota.  If the 
recipient fails to meet one-half of the job quota, then it must repay its assistance in inverse 
proportion to the percentage of expected jobs it did create. 
 178. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3.1-13 (Michie 1998). 
 179. Gilbert, supra note 15, at 484. 
 180. See id. 
 181. See Priebe & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 417 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting). 
 182. Lake River Corp. v. Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284, 1289-90 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 183. See Ziance, supra note 55, at 43. 
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B. Political and Economic Theories 
Another obstacle to the future proliferation and success of accountability 
legislation is the threat of regulatory capture.  “Regulatory capture” is the 
phrase used to describe the theory that a legislative body or regulatory agency 
will eventually represent the interests of a narrow group of people, rather than 
those of the public at large.184  The theory derives from the observation by 
economist Mancur Olson that members of a large group have less incentive to 
participate in that group’s activities than those of a small group because active 
participation is more difficult and less likely to contribute to the group’s 
overall success.185  As a result, there is a tendency for smaller, more intensely 
focused special interests, rather than nebulous “public” interests, to dominate 
legislatures and regulatory agencies.186 
As a practical matter, the theory of regulatory capture helps explain the 
widespread existence of industrial location incentives.  Such incentives are 
substantially similar to the prototypical “capture” scenario, where “[a] 
relatively small number of incumbent competitors support such measures with 
intensity, while consumer opposition is diluted and widely distributed.”187  As 
the problem of capture acts upon state legislatures, it also provides a potential 
obstacle to the enactment of meaningful accountability statutes.188  However, 
the continued efforts of certain public interest groups, such as Citizens for Tax 
Justice, does serve to level the playing field. 
The threat of regulatory capture is greatest where a state agency regulates a 
particular industry or necessarily deals with a limited class of interests.189  In 
the enactment of accountability legislation, a tension exists between the need 
to mitigate the effects of regulatory capture by denying the responsible agency 
absolute discretion in enforcement and the need to preserve flexibility so that 
incentive deals may be adaptable to unforeseen circumstances.  Generally, the 
potential for regulated groups to influence regulatory policy increases in 
proportion to the discretion vested in the regulating agency.190  Thus, Iowa’s 
New Jobs and Income Act191 and Louisiana’s Quality Jobs Program Act,192 
 
 184. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the 
Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1021 (1988). 
 185. See generally MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
 186. John Shepard Wiley, A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 
724-25 (1986). 
 187. Id. at 725. 
 188. See id. at 732. 
 189. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and 
the Public Agenda: Toward a Synthesis, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 167, 169-70 (1990). 
 190. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and Constraints on Agency 
Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 459 (1999). 
 191. IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 15.326-.337 (West 1995).  See supra notes 134-136 and 
accompanying text. 
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two statutes that provide for mandatory recapture of incentives in the event of 
default, will do more to mitigate the threat of regulatory capture than the 
Indiana193 and Arizona statutes,194 which leave enforcement decisions to the 
discretion of the authorizing office. 
If authorized agencies do decide to go after some of the biggest offenders, 
then it is a reasonable expectation that the recapture of incentives will be 
challenged in court, given the size of the financial packages at stake.195  One of 
the likely defenses will be that the recapture provisions violate the Commerce 
Clause, with the allegation that these state laws improperly burden or 
discriminate against interstate commerce. 
C. Constitutional Issues:  The Dormant Commerce Clause 
The Commerce Clause196 provides an affirmative grant to Congress to 
regulate interstate commercial activity, to avert “jealousies and aggressions”197 
between the several states and to encourage a new nation’s prosperity through 
“union and not division.”198  As a corollary to this grant of power, the United 
States Supreme Court has construed the clause to prohibit the states from 
interfering with Congressional authority by enacting laws that isolate each 
state from the national economy by discriminating against competition from 
outside the state.199  Though the contours of this judicial construction, 
colloquially referred to as the “dormant” or “negative” Commerce Clause, are 
somewhat murky,200 its application to two areas of state legislation have been 
clear.  First, a state regulation that merely promotes the in-state economy by 
making its regulatory and commercial frameworks more attractive to 
businesses will not be deemed unconstitutional.201  Second, a state regulation 
that discriminates against out-of-state interests by providing local businesses 
with an economic advantage, even where the business could be operated more 
 
 192. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:2451 et seq. (West 2001).  See supra notes 145-153 and 
accompanying text. 
 193. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3.1-13 (West 1996).  See supra notes 141-144 and accompanying 
text. 
 194. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1505.07 (1999).  See supra notes 137-140 and accompanying 
text. 
 195. For examples of large incentive deals, see supra notes 45-48 and accompanying text. 
 196. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
 197. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). 
 198. Id. at 523. 
 199. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978) (“The Court has 
consistently found parochial legislation of this kind to be constitutionally invalid . . . .”). 
 200. See, e.g., Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 458 
(1959) (describing Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence as a “quagmire”). 
 201. See, e.g., Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 336-37 (1977) 
(refusing to hold that “a [s]tate may not compete with other states for a share of interstate 
commerce” because “such competition lies at the heart of a free trade policy”). 
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efficiently outside the state, absent such regulation, is “virtually per se 
illegal.”202  The Dormant Commerce Clause as it pertains to economic 
development incentives represents a curious intersection of these two 
principles, particularly where the incentive is expressly conditioned upon the 
recipient’s continuing to remain within the regulating state’s borders or 
engaging in hiring practices or other activities to the state’s benefit. 
1. Framers’ Intent 
It has been contended that all location incentives, whether they are tied to a 
system of recapture in the event of default or not, are inconsistent with the 
Framers’ intent in creating a barrier-free trade union.203  From an economic 
perspective, location incentives are essentially a disguised barrier to the free 
movement of capital to the extent they redirect investments across borders to 
areas in which they would not have occurred absent the incentive.204  Indeed, 
some economic unions that fall short of a confederacy still impose quasi-
constitutional limitations on economic aid granted by their member states.205 
There is some basis for the notion that competition among the states in the 
form of development incentives was a concern for the drafters of the 
Constitution in vesting the federal government with the commerce power.  
Alexander Hamilton, writing on commercial competition as a source of 
contention among the states, expressed particular worry about states adopting 
commercial policies peculiar to themselves, creating “distinctions, preferences, 
and exclusions, which would beget discontent.”206  A “race to the bottom” in 
location incentives creates rivalries among the states that are very similar to 
those during the time of the nation’s confederacy.207  However, Alexander 
Hamilton, himself, was granted a tax abatement by the state of New Jersey in 
1791 to start a business.208  Furthermore, there exists equal evidence that the 
divisive commercial policies about which the Framers were concerned may 
 
 202. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970).  See also Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 
at 624 (“[W]here simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a virtually per se 
rule of invalidity has been erected.”). 
 203. This is the vision of the Commerce Clause attributed to James Madison, who intended 
the clause to be self-executing in its prevention of state interference with interstate commerce, 
thereby fostering economic union.  See Burstein & Rolnick, supra note 13 
 204. See THOMAS, supra note 5, at 4. 
 205. See, e.g., European Economic Community (EEC) Treaty, art. 87-89 (ex. art. 92-94) 
(limiting state aid to enumerated circumstances that carry a presumption of compatibility with the 
European common market). 
 206. THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 29 (Alexander Hamilton) (Bantam Classic ed., 1982). 
 207. See Enrich, supra note 3, at 423. 
 208. See Edward Regan, Government, Inc., Creating Accountability for Economic 
Development Programs, RESEARCH CENTER OF THE GOVERNMENT FINANCE OFFICERS 
ASSOCIATION 25 (Apr. 1988). 
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have been protective tariffs rather than direct subsidies or indirect economic 
incentives.209 
2. Discrimination Against Interstate Commerce 
Consistent with the notion of Framers’ intent, early Dormant Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence analogized a state’s impermissible use of its tax and 
police powers for the purpose of economic protectionism to customs duties that 
undermined the free trade union created by the Constitution.210  Such is the 
origin of the Court’s anti-discrimination case law, which renders invalid any 
state law which manifestly discriminates against interstate commerce, unless 
the law advances a legitimate local purpose and there exists no less restrictive 
alternative.211  Discrimination, in this sense, has come to mean the “differential 
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the 
former and burdens the latter.”212  For example, a Maine charitable property 
tax exemption that excluded a portion of the tax benefit to charities “conducted 
principally for the benefit of persons who are not residents of Maine”213 
facially discriminated against interstate commerce and was per se invalid 
under the Commerce Clause.214 
Statutes that are facially discriminatory against interstate commerce are not 
the only statutes that may fail to pass constitutional muster.  Rather, states 
which enact statutes that have as their apparent intent the furtherance of a 
legitimate local purpose, but also have the practical effect of discriminating 
against out-of-state competition, must also justify the discriminatory impact in 
terms of the local benefits deriving from the statute and the unavailability of a 
less restrictive alternative.215  For example, in Minnesota v. Barber,216 the 
 
 209. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 7, at 30; Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 90, at 847; see also 
3 M. FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (rev. ed. 1966) 
(reprinting a letter from James Madison attributing the inclusion in the Constitution of the 
Commerce Clause to concern over tax abuse by importing states). 
 210. See H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 532-33 (1949). 
 211. See, e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (holding 
that a surcharge imposed on out-of-state waste facially discriminated against interstate commerce 
and was unconstitutional). 
 212. Id. at 99. 
 213. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 568 (1997). 
 214. See id. at 575-76. 
 215. See Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951) (stating that a contrary view 
“would mean that the Commerce Clause of itself imposes no limitations on state action . . . save 
for the rare instance where a state artlessly disclosed an avowed purpose to discriminate against 
interstate goods.”).  The test which the Court has used to determine the existence of a valid 
statutory purpose unrelated to economic protectionism and the non-existence of a less restrictive 
alternative will be referred to herein as the “strictest scrutiny” test.  Thus far only one law has 
survived the “strictest scrutiny” analysis.  See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (upholding a 
Maine prohibition against importing bait fish because there was no other means by which the 
state could prevent the spread of parasites damaging to its native fish population).  A lesser 
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Court invalidated a law forbidding the sale of meat in Minnesota unless the 
animal had been inspected by a state official within the twenty-four hours 
before slaughter.  Though the ostensible purpose of the statute was to protect 
the health of Minnesota citizens, its necessary effect was to exclude from that 
market any animal slaughtered outside the state.217  The Court viewed such an 
effect as contrary to the notion of the republic as a free trade union, and struck 
down the statute where its object, ensuring the meat’s safety, could have been 
accomplished by less restrictive means.218 
3. Burden on Interstate Commerce 
The threshold question, then, in determining whether a state statute is so 
contrary to the free flow of interstate commercial trade that it must be 
invalidated by the Commerce Clause is whether it discriminates against 
interstate commerce or regulates commerce even-handedly.219  If the statute 
discriminates against interstate commerce, either facially or in effect, then the 
Court will analyze the statute under the “strictest scrutiny” test outlined 
above.220  Determination that a law is nondiscriminatory does not yet end the 
analysis.  A statute may regulate even-handedly yet fail Dormant Commerce 
Clause analysis if it incidentally burdens interstate commerce and that burden 
is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”221  If the 
statute’s purpose is to protect the health and welfare of its citizens, then the 
nondiscriminatory statute is likely to be upheld, as this is a subject of local 
regulation which has long been recognized.222  On the other hand, less vital 
local interests may not be sufficient.  In Pike v. Bruce Church,223 for example, 
the Court refused to enforce an Arizona law that, as applied to an Arizona 
grower of cantaloupes who packed the fruit in California, would forbid the 
grower from transporting the fruit out-of-state unless they were packaged 
according to Arizona law.224  The grower thus faced the loss of its entire year’s 
 
scrutiny may be available for laws that are discriminatory in effect, but where a legitimate local 
purpose is advanced and the law is not “patently” discriminatory.  See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. 
v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 343 n.5 (1992). 
 216. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890). 
 217. See id. at 322. 
 218. See id. at 328-29. 
 219. See Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). 
 220. See supra note 215 and accompanying text; see also Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. 
Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977); Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Mich. Dep’t of Natural 
Res., 504 U.S. 353, 359 (1992); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 411 U.S. 322, 337 (1979). 
 221. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). 
 222. See S. Pac. Co. v. Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 796 (1945) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
 223. Pike, 397 U.S. at 137. 
 224. See id. at 146. 
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crop, as it owned no nearby Arizona packing facility.225  This burden clearly 
outweighed the purpose of the law, which was to protect the reputation of 
Arizona growers by prohibiting Arizona cantaloupes from being deceptively 
packaged.226 
4. Commerce Clause Jurisprudence Applied 
The Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause tests seem 
straightforward enough in theory.  In each case, the object sought to be 
achieved is “a national market for commercial activity,”227 an object often 
overstated in the case law with broad brushstrokes of rhetorical eloquence.228  
In application, however, these tests have caused “negative-commerce-clause 
jurisprudence [to drift] far from its moorings.”229  This is especially so in 
application to development incentives, where the Court’s anti-discrimination 
case law strictly applied would require arbitrary restructuring in favor of one 
taxing scheme over another, each with the same purposes and effects, and in 
application to accountability legislation, where the case law would effectively 
undermine language that seeks to further national economic growth and 
responsibility. 
A Bright Line Blindly Drawn.  In application, the Court’s focus on the 
disparate treatment of in-state and out-of-state enterprises in its anti-
discrimination case law, rather than the distortion of the national economy with 
which the Framers were concerned,230 would result in the different 
jurisprudential treatment of location incentives that have substantially similar 
purposes and effects.  For example, investment tax credits arguably facially 
discriminate against interstate commerce by offering businesses a lower tax 
 
 225. See id. at 140. 
 226. See id. at 142. 
 227. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 595 (1997) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). 
 228. Such language, used in dicta, often makes a persuasive case for either side of the debate 
over the constitutionality of development incentives.  Compare, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 
397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970) (“The Court has viewed with particular suspicion state statutes 
requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that could more efficiently be 
performed elsewhere.”), and West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994) 
(analogizing a subsidy to in-state producers of milk to protective tariffs and “their distorting 
effects on the geography of production”), with Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 
U.S. 318, 336 (1977) (“Our decision today does not prevent the States from structuring their tax 
systems to encourage the growth and development of interstate commerce and industry.”), and 
Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 271 (1984) (“No one disputes that a State may enact 
laws . . . that have the purpose and effect of encouraging domestic industry.”).  See also 
Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 90 at 791-92 (introducing the “palpable tension” in the Court’s 
anti-discrimination case law). 
 229. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 595 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 230. See Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992). 
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burden for each new facility or piece of equipment transferred in-state than that 
which would be faced by an equivalent business out-of-state.231  Meanwhile, a 
property tax abatement generally places no discriminatory burden on out-of-
state entities because they are not subject to the tax in the first place.232  
Investment tax credits and property tax abatements, however, share the same 
economic intent and effect—they both seek to encourage in-state investment, 
not by efficiencies and infrastructural advantages, but by directly reducing the 
relative tax of the enterprise relocating in-state.233  A rule requiring states to 
contain their tax incentives within activities taxable only to in-state enterprises 
would do little to further the goals of illegalizing discriminatory taxes or 
mitigating interstate competition for business and its resultant economic 
distortion.234 
 
 231. See, e.g., Enrich, supra note 3, at 434-36 (“The statutory provisions establishing ITC’s 
typically include an express requirement that qualifying investments must be located within the 
state, leaving little room for question that the provisions discriminate on their faces.”).  This 
conclusion also finds support in the language of six Dormant Commerce Clause cases involving 
tax incentives that the Court has heard since 1977.  In each of the six cases the Court ruled against 
the operation of the state statute.  See Roundtable, 56 STATE TAX REV. 49, at 9 (1995).  For 
example, in Boston Stock Exchange the Court struck down a New York law that imposed a higher 
tax burden on interstate sales of securities than those that were conducted wholly in New York.  
See Boston Stock Exch., 429 U.S. at 331.  The Court found the law prevented tax-neutral 
decisions about when and where to purchase securities and created both a local advantage to New 
York and a discriminatory burden on neighboring states.  See id.  The result was a tax structure 
that diverted sales from their “most economically efficient channels” in a manner which was 
“wholly inconsistent with the free trade purpose of the Commerce Clause.”  Id. at 336. 
   Moreover, of the state statutes involved in these six cases, the one at issue in 
Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Tully, 466 U.S. 388 (1984), bears the most resemblance to the 
economic development incentives discussed herein.  In Westinghouse, the Court invalidated a 
New York state tax credit that accrued as a percentage of the gross receipts from export products 
shipped from a taxpayer’s regular place of business within New York.  See id. at 407.  The Court 
found that the “discriminatory economic effect” of a tax credit that favored local transactions was 
indistinguishable from a tax that simply imposed a higher rate on out-of-state transactions, as in 
Boston Stock Exchange.  Id. at 404-05.  Thus, the tax credit improperly fostered local 
development by creating a preferential trade area within a state’s borders in contravention of the 
Commerce Clause.  See id. at 405. 
 232. See Enrich, supra note 3, at 446-47. 
 233. See id. at 447. 
 234. This is because one of two results would ensue.  On the one hand, if the relative share of 
a single state’s tax revenue shifted from activities taxable only to in-state enterprises to activities 
taxable to all, the constitutional property tax abatement and the unconstitutional investment tax 
credit ultimately would become equally discriminatory.  In effect, out-of-state businesses would 
share a greater percentage of the cumulative state tax burden.  This first result, however, is 
unlikely, because an increase in tax on other economic activities would have the effect of 
discouraging such activities.  The second result would either be an increase in the tax burden 
borne by individuals, or, more likely, a decrease in the availability of public goods and services, 
which is the very problem which gave rise to the search for this attempted solution. 
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Bright lines become even more muddled when one considers the differing 
treatment of incentives in the form of cash outlays versus those in the form of 
tax relief. The Court has never ruled on the constitutionality of direct 
expenditures to encourage investment, but early indications were that the Court 
seemed to assume their constitutionality.235  In the words of the Court, “[d]irect 
subsidization of domestic industry does not ordinarily run afoul of [the 
Commerce Clause]; discriminatory taxation  . . . does.”236  This assumption 
runs against the common logic that a location incentive is economically 
equivalent whether it is given before taxes become due or afterwards.  
Legitimate efforts have been made to distinguish direct subsidies from taxes on 
the basis of their political visibility,237 but nonetheless several commentators 
have properly questioned the assumption that a determination that a state 
program is a “subsidy” or a “tax credit” should be the touchstone of the 
constitutional analysis.238 
The Double-Negative Commerce Clause.  Even more troubling than the 
incoherence in the application of the Court’s anti-discrimination case law to 
location incentives, generally, is the clarity with which the law seems to 
illegalize the very accountability measures designed to curb, in the absence of 
congressional action, the deleterious effects of economically distorting 
subsidies in the first place.  For example, Indiana’s Economic Development for 
a Growing Economy Tax Credit239 expressly requires, as a precondition to 
obtaining the credit, a showing that the recipient business is actively being 
courted by other states and that there is a disparity between the cost of locating 
in such states and the cost of locating in Indiana.240  Illinois’ “High Impact 
Business” tax credit241 provides for automatic rescission of the credit if it is 
determined that the recipient would have otherwise relocated to Illinois absent 
 
 235. See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
 236. New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988). 
 237. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 90, at 847-48; Enrich, supra note 3, at 442-43.  
See also Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 591 (1997). 
 238. For critical commentary, see generally BORIS I. BITTKER, BITTKER ON THE REGULATION 
OF INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE §6.06[G], at 6-77 et seq. (1999); Note, Functional 
Analysis, Subsidies, and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1537 (1997); 
Edward A. Zelinsky, Are Tax “Benefits” Constitutionally Equivalent to Direct Expenditures?, 
112 HARV. L. REV. 379 (1998).  For a Supreme Court criticism, see Rosenberger v. Rector of the 
University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 859 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“A tax exemption is in 
many cases economically and functionally indistinguishable from a direct monetary subsidy.”).  
See also West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 208-09 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(noting that subsidies funded out of general revenues always have the effect of burdening 
interstate commerce because at least a portion of those revenues derive from taxes on out-of-state 
products). 
 239. IND. CODE ANN. § 6-3.1-13 (West 1996). 
 240. See Gilbert, supra note 15, at 483. 
 241. 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 655/5.5 (West 1993). 
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the credit.242  Given that the diversion of business from its “most economically 
efficient channels” is “wholly inconsistent with the free trade purpose of the 
Commerce Clause,”243 those portions of the Indiana and Illinois statutes which 
seek to enforce the otherwise unstated purpose of the incentive could hardly be 
said to withstand constitutional scrutiny.  In other words, even though the 
diversion of business from its “most economically efficient channels” would 
actually increase absent that language, it is precisely that language which 
renders such incentive packages facially discriminatory and hence 
unconstitutional.  Indeed, the Toledo litigation244 seeks to invalidate an Ohio 
property tax exemption solely on the grounds that it is “conditioned upon the 
taxpayer’s agreement to provide a specified number of jobs, and a specified 
volume of investment, within the state of Ohio.”245 
The end result of that logic is the use of the Commerce Clause, through 
years of judicial interpretation, to undermine the very purposes it was designed 
to serve.  The inherent tension in the negative aspect of the Commerce Clause 
is between, on the one hand, the desire to avert “jealousies and aggressions”246 
among the several states by “creat[ing] an area of free trade” free from 
parochial interference247 and, on the other hand, “considerations of state 
sovereignty [and] the role of each State ‘as guardian and trustee for its 
people.’”248  Severing an allegedly constitutional location incentive from its 
allegedly unconstitutional enforcement mechanism serves neither side of that 
debate.  Instead, it interferes with state autonomy by declaring as 
unconstitutional the only realistic means by which a state can ensure its 
treasury is put to productive use in the “economic war among the states” while 
sanctioning competitive state efforts that prolong the distorting effects of that 
war on the national economy.  What remains is a constitutional black hole, 
where “the essential and patently unobjectionable [function] of state 
government—to serve the citizens of the State”249 is paralyzed, and the 
Commerce Clause collapses inward to serve a purpose directly opposite of that 
which its authors intended. 
States as Market Participants.  There is some merit to the argument that in 
contracting for benefits to its citizens in exchange for financial relief, the state 
is acting as a participant in the market for investment, thus placing location 
 
 242. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 655/5.5(f). 
 243. Boston Stock Exch. v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 336 (1977). 
 244. See supra notes 102-103 and accompanying text. 
 245. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to All Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss Re: 
Inapplicability of Commerce Clause at 28, Cuno v. DaimlerChrysler Inc., 154 F. Supp. 2d 1196 
(N.D. Ohio 2001) (No. 3:00cv7247). 
 246. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935). 
 247. McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330 (1944). 
 248. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 438 (1980). 
 249. Id. at 442. 
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incentives in a category of cases with which the Commerce Clause is 
unconcerned.250  States that are acting as market participants, not as market 
regulators, are free to act in a manner that discriminates against out-of-state 
interests where Congress is otherwise silent on the issue.251  The justification is 
that when the state is acting as market participant, the citizens of that state, and 
not the outside interests, are bearing the burden of providing the in-state 
benefit.252  Similarly, when a development authority is contracting with 
businesses to induce the development of new facilities and new jobs, the state 
is acting simultaneously as an investor and a promoter, and its taxpayers are 
the ones that bear the burden if the venture fails.  Thus, in specifying 
conditions under which the assistance is to be given, the state is doing nothing 
more than a private actor might do in the same situation. 
It has been argued that the market participant exception may not apply, 
however, where accountability measures in subsidies and incentive tax credits 
are used to foster goals that are unrelated to the state’s proprietary interest in 
market transactions.253  For example, one commentator notes that a property 
tax exemption used as an inducement to relocate within the state and tied to the 
requirement that the recipient pay its employees a minimum salary may not 
provide the essential nexus to qualify for the exception.254  In other words, the 
incentive improperly ties the exemption to an activity, the payment of 
employees, entirely distinct from the state’s investment in the property.255  
Here the state is arguably using contractual arrangements to act as regulators.  
It might be argued, then, that almost all recapture provisions invalidate a 
location incentive that otherwise would fall under the market participant 
exception.256 
As with the case law from which the exception was carved, the severance 
of the allegedly unconstitutional accountability measure from the allegedly 
constitutional incentive undermines both the “creation of a barrier-free market” 
motive of and the “state autonomy” limitation on the Commerce Clause.  
Certainly, a more sensible policy would be one that fosters a “[s]tate’s power 
 
 250. See White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Employers, 460 U.S. 204 (1983) (upholding, 
under the market participant exception, a city requirement that half of all workers on publicly 
funded construction projects be local residents). 
 251. See 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: 
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 11.9, at 183 (3d ed. 1999); see also Reeves, 447 U.S. at 429 
(holding that a state may, as market participant, limit the sale of cement produced at a state-
operated cement plant to its own residents). 
 252. See 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 251, at 184. 
 253. See Moss et al., supra note 159, at 68. 
 254. See Hellerstein & Coenen, supra note 90, at 826. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See generally Edward P. Lazarus, The Commerce Clause Limitation on the Power to 
Condemn a Relocation, 96 YALE L.J. 1343 (1987). 
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to experiment with different methods of encouraging local industry,”257 while 
containing any “distorting effects on the geography of production.”258  That 
policy is furthered by a structure of state economic development that courts 
enterprises on the basis of their synergies with surrounding communities and 
the likelihood that development assistance, if pursued nationwide, will 
collectively nurture, rather than sap, the internal public resources of those 
communities.  Those portions of state statutes that require, as a precondition to 
the giving of assistance, specific findings as to the net public benefit of such a 
transaction, and ensure those benefits by instituting financial consequences in 
the event of non-compliance, are thus the saving grace of such statutes, rather 
than their downfall, in terms of their conformity with the underlying purposes 
of the Commerce Clause.259 
Consider, again, the distinction made in the case law between subsidies 
and discriminatory tax provisions.  As this Note has demonstrated, if 
classification as a “subsidy” were all that is necessary to constitutionally 
sanctify a location incentive, then “little imagination is required to foresee 
future state actions ‘set[ting] barrier[s] to traffic between one state and another 
as effective as if customs duties . . . had been laid . . . .’”260  The underlying 
justifications for the distinction, however, are sound, even if actual practice 
does not support the classification terms.  One justification is that a subsidy, as 
part of a state’s annual appropriations, is made public and exposed to recurring 
review, whereas tax credits, as a permanent statutory feature, are more 
insulated from political checks.261  A second is that tax credits are 
indiscriminate and available to all who meet the statutory requisites, while 
subsidies are traditionally targeted for their unique community benefit.262  A 
third justification is that subsidies are given in a fixed amount, but tax 
deductions and credits, being dependent on the amount of taxable income or 
property for which the beneficiary receives a percentage exemption, are 
dynamic and often uncapped.263  When accountability legislation requires the 
targeting of specific businesses on the basis of expected public benefits, 
subjects the financial assistance to meaningful and ongoing review, and 
 
 257. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 816 (1974) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 258. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 193 (1994). 
 259. The corollary of that conclusion is that indiscriminate and unchecked development 
incentives are more likely to be found contrary to the protection of a national common market.  
For that reason, this Note does not take issue with at least one of the claims in the pending Toledo 
litigation and will not enter the debate as to whether location incentives, as a whole, should be 
upheld or struck down. 
 260. Hughes, 426 U.S. at 828-29 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (alterations in 
original). 
 261. See Zelinsky, supra note 238, at 401-03. 
 262. See id., at 404-06. 
 263. See id., at 401-03. 
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bestows the power to rescind, modify or recoup the assistance given, it renders 
location incentives more like the presumably constitutional “subsidy” rather 
than the discriminatory tax. 
Finally, not all state policies that have the obvious purpose or effect of 
discriminating against out-of-state interests are prohibited by the Constitution.  
For example, policies such as the reduction of college tuition for residents, the 
award of social welfare benefits and payments to physicians in rural and low-
income areas, are commonly accepted as legally permissible without 
litigation.264  The common thread of these policies is that they are state 
expenditures in support of public goods and services, in furtherance of “the 
essential and patently unobjectionable purpose of state government.”265  In the 
current interstate competition for location of businesses, states are attempting, 
albeit misguidedly, to employ a private intermediary to accomplish these 
public goals.  Ultimately, however, the extent to which authorizing statutes 
guarantee the investment is put to public purposes is directly proportional to 
the extent to which the state is acting as a “purchaser” of public goods within 
the meaning of the market participant exception to the Dormant Commerce 
Clause. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
With the recent enactment of accountability legislation, over sixty 
jurisdictions have taken the first step in striking a balance between the pressure 
to remain competitive as an attractive location for industry and the need to 
ensure that their financial stake is not abused.  As this Comment illustrates, 
careful drafting of the provisions therein, after giving consideration to contract 
law, political and economic concerns, and constitutional issues, will be the 
ultimate factor in determining whether these statutes sink or swim.  Ultimately, 
however, their mere enactment is a signal to other legislators that states and 
municipalities may empower themselves to make economic development more 
efficient and curb the shift in resources from valuable public goods and 
services to the private concerns of those wielding more substantial economic 
clout. 
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